Author: Jim Chapman
In Hughes v. Garcia, 100 F.4th Cir. 611 (5th Cir. 2024), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit discussed the contours of and the extent to which the doctrine of qualified immunity protects government employees from liability in suits filed against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As the Fifth Circuit put it: “For those who worry that qualified immunity can be invoked under absurd circumstances: Buckle up.” Id. at 614. The relevant, “absurd” facts are as follows.
On March 23, 2019, at approximately 2:37 a.m., Plaintiff Austin Thompson Hughes, a former police officer, was driving for Uber. While driving, he saw a white GMC Sierra pickup truck swerving erratically on Interstate 610 in Houston, Texas. Suspecting that the truck’s driver was intoxicated, Hughes dialed 911 and followed the Sierra with his Jeep’s flashers on. During the call, Hughes described the Sierra and his own vehicle and reported that the truck swerving at high speed, hitting the concrete barriers on both sides of the highway, and finally coming to a stop. Hughes’s two Uber passengers could be heard on the recording confirming Hughes’s observations. Hughes stopped behind the Sierra, and at some point, Hughes’s 911 call was transferred to a Houston Medical 911 operator.
After the transfer, Hughes continued his report to the second 911 operator. Hughes told the 911 operator: “I need to get [the driver] out of the car because, I mean, they’re going to kill somebody.” Hughes, then, exited his vehicle, observed that the driver was obviously intoxicated, and retrieved the driver’s keys, license (which was sitting in the Sierra’s center cupholder), and bottles of alcohol. A third-party caller corroborated many of these details to another 911 operator, including Hughes trying to get the drunk driver out of the car.
When he returned to his Jeep, still on the phone with 911, Hughes saw the intoxicated driver exit the Sierra and attempt to flee towards the center of the interstate on foot. Hughes yelled at the driver to get back in his truck in an attempt to prevent him from being hit by oncoming traffic. The 911 operator then disconnected the call, assuring Hughes that emergency units were on their way.
The drunk man continued to move into oncoming traffic on foot. Therefore, Hughes felt that the best and safest option would be to physically restrain the suspect, and so, he retrieved handcuffs from his Jeep and used them to temporarily detain the drunk man. At no point did Hughes identify himself as a police officer. Finally, Hughes suggested that his two Uber passengers request a new ride, which they did.
When Houston Police Officers Michael Garcia and Joshua Few arrived on the scene (roughly 17 minutes after Hughes’s initial 911 call), they re-handcuffed the drunk driver and asked Hughes to meet them at a nearby gas station so that they could take his statement. At the gas station, Officer Garcia interviewed the drunk driver while Officer Few interviewed Hughes. Hughes recounted his observations of the pickup truck’s erratic movements, the driver’s multiple collisions with the median and concrete barrier, and his assessment of the driver’s intoxication. Hughes also told Officer Few that he used to be a police officer. When he finished taking the drunk driver’s statement, Officer Garcia asked Hughes for his Uber passengers’ contact information. Hughes explained that Uber’s privacy policies prevented him from accessing that information, but he showed Officer Garcia his Uber app, including the details of his most recent trip. Later, at Officer Garcia’s request, Hughes emailed Officer Garcia screenshots of his Uber trip details.
Despite the plethora of evidence against him (including the man’s confession that the was too drunk to drive), the officers did not arrest the drunk driver. Instead, the Officers focused on an alleged offense for “Impersonating an Officer” and identified Hughes as the suspect. The Officers’ reports of the incident credited the drunk driver’s statement that Hughes told the drunk driver that he was a police officer, despite the blatant inconsistencies in the drunk driver’s statement and the obvious fact that the man was intoxicated at the time that he made his statement to the Officers.
Two days later, Officer Garcia signed a probable cause affidavit based on his false incident report. The affidavit asserted that Hughes unlawfully, intentionally impersonated a public servant, namely a peace officer with intent to induce the drunk driver to submit to his pretended official authority and to rely on his pretended official acts, by stating that he was a Police Officer. The affidavit included information gathered by both Officer Garcia and Officer Few during the investigation.
Notably, the affidavit recounted several details allegedly from Hughes’s 911 call, but the affidavit omitted critical information, like Hughes’s play-by-play of the Sierra swerving erratically down the highway, his description of his own vehicle, and Hughes yelling at the drunk driver to get back in the car. Instead, the affidavit asserted that Hughes could be heard on the 911 call asking the drunk driver for his identification. According to Hughes, he never made that request—the drunk driver’s license was in the cupholder of the Sierra, so Hughes simply retrieved it.
In addition, the probable cause affidavit included additional, different details of the incident that were blatantly false. Perhaps most tellingly, the probable cause affidavit omitted that the officers’ sole basis for believing Hughes committed a felony—the drunk driver’s statement—came from the ramblings of a man who flunked all six clues in the intoxication test.
Finally, as to Hughes’s statement, the affidavit omitted any corroborating evidence supporting Hughes’s account of the incident. For example, the affidavit omitted the third-party 911 call and the screenshots from Hughes’s Uber app. Instead, the affidavit simply reported that Hughes would not disclose his passengers’ contact information.
Despite these misstatements, omissions, and inconsistencies, Officer Garcia submitted the probable cause affidavit to the District Attorney’s office. Based upon this affidavit, the District Attorney charged Hughes with felony impersonation of a public servant, and a state criminal court issued a warrant for Hughes’s arrest.
At about 3:00 a.m. on March 25, 2019, Officers Few and Garcia went to Hughes’s home to arrest him. Hughes, who was asleep with his wife at the time, answered the Officers through the door. Officers Few and Garcia asked to see Hughes’s Uber app, insisting that they needed to see his actual cell phone rather than the screenshots that he had already sent. Hughes cracked open the door to give his cell phone to the officers, but instead of taking the phone, the Officers grabbed Hughes’s outstretched arm and pulled him out of his apartment into the hallway and handcuffed him. Hughes was placed in the county jail’s general population for over twenty-four (24) hours before being released on March 26, 2019.
Hughes was subsequently charged with third-degree felony impersonation of a peace officer in violation of Texas state law. Almost three months later, on June 17, 2019, the District Attorney’s Office moved to dismiss the criminal charges against Hughes because no probable cause existed to believe that he had committed the crime. The state court dismissed the case the same day.
Thereafter, Hughes sued various officials, the City of Houston, and Harris County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. In his Complaint, Hughes alleged that Officers Few and Garcia violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution by filing a false report or by knowingly standing by while the other officer did so. Officers Few and Garcia moved to dismiss Hughes’ complaint, asserting that they were protected from liability based upon the doctrine of qualified immunity. The District Court denied the Officers’ motions to dismiss, and Officers Few and Garcia filed an interlocutory appeal to the Fifth Circuit challenging the District Court’s determination that they were not immune from this suit based upon qualified immunity.
However, the Officers’ assertion of qualified immunity was not met favorably by the Fifth Circuit. In rejecting the Officers’ argument and in affirming the District Court’s finding that the Officers were not protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity, the Fifth Circuit explained that qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. Government officials are entitled to immunity from § 1983 suits for damages arising from their duties unless the plaintiff can show (1) that the officer violated a federal statutory or constitutional right and (2) that the unlawfulness of the conduct was clearly established at the time. The Officers argued to the Fifth Circuit that they were protected by qualified immunity because, even if they violated Hughes’s Constitutional rights, they were shielded from liability by the fact that an independent intermediary (namely the magistrate who approved their application for an arrest warrant) blessed their unconstitutional conduct.
The Fifth Circuit disagreed. The Fifth Circuit explained that the independent intermediary doctrine ensures that officers can make reasonable probable cause mistakes because a warrant secured from a judicial officer typically insulates law enforcement personnel who rely on it from liability for unlawful arrest, even in the absence of probable cause. This shield applies because, if facts supporting an arrest are placed before an independent intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury, the intermediary’s decision breaks the chain of causation for the Fourth Amendment violation.
However, the Fifth Circuit noted that the independent intermediary doctrine has an important exception. If it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue, a neutral magistrate’s signature will not protect the offending officers. The shield also does not apply if the officer lied or made material omissions in a warrant application. Therefore, an officer cannot avoid liability where a warrant affidavit (1) contains false statements or material omissions (2) made with at least reckless disregard for the truth that (3) were necessary to the finding of probable cause. An officer’s decision to submit such an affidavit violates the Fourth Amendment.
In this case, the Fifth Circuit found that Hughes had stated a proper claim against Officer Few by alleging that Officer Few contributed false statements to the incident report, knowing that report would be used in the warrant affidavit. Hughes also alleged that Officer Few knew that Officer Garcia had omitted critical information in the relevant documents and failed to correct those false documents. Under either theory, the Fifth Circuit found that Hughes had presented enough facts to support a Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Few.
As for Officer Garcia, the Fifth Circuit noted that, in addition to his incident report contributions, Officer Garcia prepared and submitted the warrant affidavit that directly led to Hughes’s arrest. That affidavit contained numerous false statements and material omissions. Most importantly, Officer Garcia materially altered the drunk driver’s statement from the incident report. Officer Garcia’s version of the drunk driver’s statement in the warrant affidavit patched many of the obvious holes in the incident report. By altering these details, Officer Garcia’s affidavit manufactured a more credible narrative. All told, the Fifth Circuit found that Officer Garcia’s affidavit made at least eight material misstatements or omissions, and any reasonable officer would have known, based on the evidence available, that the affidavit contained these errors. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Hughes sufficiently plead that Officer Garcia had violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by producing and submitting the affidavit.
In conclusion, the Fifth Circuit stated that it was unclear which part of this case was more amazing: (1) that officers refused to charge a severely intoxicated driver and, instead, brought felony charges against the Good Samaritan who intervened to protect Houstonians; or (2) that the City of Houston continued to defend the Officers’ conduct. Either way, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the District Court that the Officers were not protected from liability in this case based upon the doctrine of qualified immunity, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order denying the Officers’ motion to dismiss this case.
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