|
The United States Supreme Court decided another
case impacting law enforcement operations on June 18th. i
The case concerns whether a passenger in a vehicle which
has been unlawfully stopped can challenge the basis of the
stop when evidence is discovered relative to the passenger.
In other words, does the passenger have an expectation in
a vehicle they have been riding in, such that they can challenge
the stop?
Bruce Brendlin was a passenger in a vehicle
driven by Karen Simeroth when the vehicle was stopped at
1:40 in
the morning
on November 27, 2001. Deputy Brokenbrough had observed
Simeroth’s
1993 Buick with expired tags. Prior to the stop he had
run the vehicle registration and determined that an application
for registration was in progress and the vehicle has a
temporary
tag indicating that the temporary registration expired
at the end of November. Notwithstanding all indications
that
this vehicle was registered, Deputy Brokenbrough decided
to stop the vehicle because he could not determine if
the temporary tag matched the vehicle. It was subsequently
determined
that this stop was bad due to the evidence that the vehicle
did, in fact, meet the registration requirements.
Upon stopping
and approaching the vehicle, Deputy Brokenbrough observed
a passenger that he knew to be one of the Brendlin
brothers. He was also aware that one of the Brendlins,
either Scott or Bruce, had skipped out on his parole. The
officer
asked Brendlin his name, at which time the subject lied
and stated his name was Bruce Brown. While at the vehicle,
Deputy Brokenbrough observed receptacles in the vehicle
that contained substances used for the manufacture of
methamphetamine. Brokenbrough returned to his police vehicle
and verified
that Bruce Brendlin was a parole violator and had a no-bail
warrant. At one point, while waiting, Brendlin opened
the door of the Buick but then closed it again. Brokenbrough
then called for back-up and took Brendlin out at gunpoint,
arresting him for the parole violation warrant.
Upon a
search incident to arrest the officer found the cap from
a syringe in Brendlin’s pocket, two syringes
in the car, marijuana and methamphetamine on Simeroth.
Materials used for the manufacture of methamphetamine
were found in
the backseat. When the trial court refused to suppress
the evidence as to Brendlin, he pled guilty to methamphetamine
manufacturing charges. His argument for suppression had
been that the stop of the vehicle was illegal, therefore
he was unlawfully seized and the evidence found as a result
of the bad stop and seizure was the fruit of the poisonous
tree. The trial court, in refusing to suppress the evidence
found that Brendlin, as a passenger, had been free to
leave
at any point during the stop and this had not been seized
until after the officer recognized him as a parole violator
and placed him under arrest. The Court of Appeal for California
reversed the trial court and concluded that the evidence
should have been suppressed. This led to an appeal in
the California Supreme Court, which sided with the trial
court
and held that the evidence was good. Brendlin is now appealing
that decision to the United States Supreme Court.
In analyzing
this case, the United States Supreme Court rejected the
opinion of the California Supreme Court with
respect to a passenger’s seizure. The Court focused
on when a seizure occurs. In doing so the court noted that
a physical seizure occurs when there is a stopping of movement
by a means intentionally applied while a show of authority
seizure occurs when law enforcement shows authority and
the subject of the seizure complies with that show of authority.
The California court had concluded that although the officer
in this case had showed authority in stopping the vehicle,
Brendlin, as the passenger had not had an opportunity to
comply since the show of authority had been directed at
the driver and not at him and thus he had not been seized.
The
Supreme Court reiterated that an analysis of a seizure
includes whether the actions or conduct of law enforcement
would lead the reasonable innocent person to believe that
they were free to leave. The Court concluded that a reasonable
person who was a passenger in a car that was stopped by
police would not believe that they were free to leave
and
would believe that they must stay put. The Court cited
to their previous decisions giving officers some authority
over passengers to provide support for the fact that passengers
are not free during a traffic stop. ii
The Court
asserted: “It is also reasonable for passengers
to expect that a police officer at the scene of a crime,
arrest, or investigation will not let people move around
in ways that could jeopardize his safety. In Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997), we held that during a lawful
traffic stop an officer may order a passenger out of the
car as a precautionary measure, without reasonable suspicion
that the passenger poses a safety risk. Id., at
414-415; cf. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam)
(driver may be ordered out of the car as a matter of course).
In fashioning this rule, we invoked our earlier statement
that "'[t]he risk of harm to both the police and the
occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise
unquestioned command of the situation.'" Wilson,
supra, at 414 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S.
692, 702-703
(1981)). What we have said in these opinions probably reflects
a societal expectation of "'unquestioned [police] command'" at
odds with any notion that a passenger would feel free
to leave, or to terminate the personal encounter any
other way, without advance permission.” The Court concluded
that the passengers in a vehicle are seized during a
traffic stop and therefore can challenge
the validity of the stop. Thus, Brendlin could challenge
the validity of the stop which occurred here and seek
the suppression of the evidence which was found. The Court
then
remanded the case back to the California courts to determine
whether the evidence should be suppressed or allowed in
on some other basis.
At first glance this may appear to
be a bad case for law enforcement; however, it is actually
a good case for law
enforcement. If the California prosecution had prevailed
in this case, law enforcement would have had no authority
over passengers during lawful car stops. Such a rule would
have placed law enforcement at a significant disadvantage
in officer safety. Instead, the United States Supreme
Court decided in favor of a defendant’s right to challenge
a seizure in a minor drug case, and in doing so, upheld
the authority of law enforcement over passengers in all
traffic stops.
CITATIONS:
i Brendlin v. California, 2007 U.S. LEXIS
7897 (June 18, 2007).
ii See, Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 407 (1997) (allowing officers to order passengers
from any lawfully stopped vehicle during a traffic stop for officer safety).
|
History
of the Case
Bruce Brendlin
was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Karen Simeroth when the vehicle
was stopped at 1:40 in the morning on November 27, 2001. Deputy Brokenbrough
had observed Simeroth’s 1993 Buick with expired tags. Prior
to the stop he had run the vehicle registration and determined that
an application for registration was in progress and the vehicle has
a temporary tag indicating that the temporary registration expired
at the end of November. Notwithstanding all indications that this
vehicle was registered, Deputy Brokenbrough decided to stop the vehicle
because he could not determine if the temporary tag matched the vehicle.
It was subsequently determined that this stop was bad due to the
evidence that the vehicle did, in fact, meet the registration requirements.
Read Complete Article
About the Author:
Jack Ryan is the Co-Director of the Legal & Liability
Risk Management Institute (www.llrmi.com)
and an attorney in Rhode Island, a graduate Juris Doctorate, Cum
Laude Suffolk University Law School. Jack has 20 years police experience
as a police officer with the Providence Police Department, Providence,
RI.
Jack’s law degree and experience as a police
officer gives him the unique perspective of the legal and liability
issues.
Jack is a former adjunct faculty member at Salve Regina
University and lectures frequently throughout the United States.
Jack Ryan
Legal & Liability Risk Management Institute
5101
Decatur Blvd. Suite L
Indianapolis, Indiana 46241
Phone: (800)365-0119
Fax: (317) 821-5096
Cell: (401) 692-1555
|
